Abstract. This study examines whether measures of job quality in India's manufacturing sector differ systematically across states with varying types of labor regulation. The analysis uses repeated cross sections of India's NSSO household survey data from 1983 to 2004 merged with data on state-level regulations affecting employment adjustment and dispute resolution. Results from a differences-in-differences procedure show that restrictions on employment adjustment and dispute settlement in a pro-worker direction contribute to improved job quality for women for most measures. However, such regulations yield mixed results for men since higher wages come at the expense of fewer hours, some substitution toward in-kind compensation, and less job security. We conclude that India's employment protection legislation does have a silver lining when considering job quality, but that silver lining does not apply universally. JEL Classification Codes: J52, K31, J31, O14, O12
I. INTRODUCTION
Discussions of labor regulations often take place in a framework that highlights the cost of compliance. In such a framework, firms may hire fewer workers, substitute toward laborsaving technologies, and take on more casual home-based workers in an effort to reduce labor costs. Several studies have found empirical support for these arguments including Botero et al. (2004) which found that more highly regulated labor markets are associated with greater unemployment and more informal sector activity. Similarly, Amin (2009) found that retail stores in India responded to the cost of stricter labor laws by substituting away from workers to computers. In contrast, stronger rights for workers can have beneficial macroeconomic effects by enhancing labor market stability which helps to foster domestic and foreign investment.
Investment, in turn, spurs economic growth and the creation of new jobs in the formal sector (Stiglitz 2002; Rodrik 1999) . These contrasting effects of regulations may be mediated by competitive pressures introduced through liberalization and globalization (Standing 1999) . For example, even though developing country workers have gained new employment opportunities from increased integration with global markets, the jobs are often temporary, casual, flexible, and characterized by poor working conditions. India constitutes an interesting case study in this debate on the costs and benefits of strong labor market regulations against a backdrop of market-oriented macroeconomic reforms.
As a federal constitutional republic, India's labor market exhibits substantial variation across its twenty-eight geographical states in terms of the regulatory environment. Labor regulations have historically fallen under the purview of states, a system that has allowed state governments to decide whether to enact labor legislation that gives employers more flexibility (pro-business) or gives workers greater protection (pro-worker). Furthermore, starting in the early-1990s, India underwent sweeping deregulation in trade and industry mainly in response to external pressures that emanated from a balance of payments crisis.
The payments crisis and India's relatively slow economic growth in the preceding two decades had many roots, one of which was the prevalence of a restrictive labor market regime.
To test if regulations had adverse impacts, Besley and Burgess (2004) used detailed manufacturing-sector data for India from 1958 to 1992 and found that states which adopted relatively pro-worker industrial relations policies had lower output, productivity, investment, and employment in the formal sector. This conclusion has subsequently received mixed support. In a study supporting these results, Sanyal and Menon (2005) argued that pro-worker policies may manifest themselves in greater instances of labor turmoil. The authors found that states with a relatively high number of strikes, number of man-days lost in work-stoppages, and percentage of unionized workers experienced less domestic investment. Also finding negative effects, Hasan et al. (2003) used the Besley and Burgess measure of labor laws to analyze how labor market adjustments to trade liberalization varied across states. They found that states with restrictive labor regulations experienced smaller increases in labor demand elasticities following India's trade reforms compared to states with more flexible labor markets, implying that firms in the more restrictive states were at a competitive disadvantage in their ability to adjust their inputs in response to growing integration in world markets. However, Bhattacharjea (2006) characterized these earlier results as fragile, with the argument that the Besley and Burgess measure of proemployer and pro-worker reforms did not clearly disentangle cross-state variations in labor regulations from differences in industrial relations and investment climates. What matters more, according to Bhattacharjea's critique, is the actual enforcement of labor laws and the judicial interpretation of India's Industrial Disputes Act (IDA) of 1947.
In terms of the costs and benefits associated with labor laws and globalization, some have argued that women in particular have borne the burden of inadequate enforcement of labor standards as countries incorporate into a uniform global trading order. For example, Menon and Rodgers (2009) examined the impact of trade openness on India's gender wage gap in manufacturing and found that pressures to cut costs from international competition led to a reduction in women's relative pay. Lack of enforcement of labor standards appears to have left women with less bargaining power and limited wage gains compared to men.
Within this broader context, our objective is to study the association between labor regulations and job quality in India. The analysis adds to the debate on India's strict labor laws by examining whether measures of job quality differ systematically across states with variations in statutory laws that govern industrial and labor relations. The empirical work uses five waves of household survey data spanning the 1983-2004 period, merged together with an updated database on employment regulation in India's manufacturing sector that takes Bhattacharjea (2006)'s critique into account. As indicators of job quality, the analysis focuses specifically on wage levels, intensity of work activity (likelihood of working full-time), mode of payment (likelihood of being paid in cash only), job security, and the residual gender wage gap. States that took a pro-employer stance in their amendments to labor regulations are expected to exhibit downward pressure on wages, lower rates of full-time work, and more precarious forms of payment and employment. In contrast, labor law amendments in a relatively pro-worker direction are expected to have had positive effects on measures of job quality despite pressures to the contrary from an increasingly competitive economic environment.
Results from a differences-in-differences-in-differences procedure are consistent with these expectations. In particular, regulations associated with employment adjustment in a pro-worker direction and with prolonging the length of dispute settlement have large positive impacts on job quality across the board for women, as measured by wage levels and the probability of working full-time, working for cash only, and having a secure job. The results for men are more mixed. While men's wages rise and their job security improves following regulatory changes that make it more difficult for employers to adjust the size of their workforce, men may be bearing the costs of these regulations through fewer working hours and a substitution from cash to inkind compensation. Similarly, regulations that extend the duration of dispute resolution raise men's wages and increase the likelihood of having full-time work but at a cost of less job security. Finally, regulations that make it easier for workers to initiate and sustain industrial disputes or that lengthen the resolution of such disputes contribute to a higher residual wage gap between men and women. Hence, amendments in a pro-worker direction can be welfareenhancing in terms of job quality but the benefits do entail tradeoffs for both men and women.
II. LABOR REGULATIONS AND THE BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT
Like many developing countries in the post-WWII era, India based its economic development and trade policies on an import substitution strategy.
1 The country had some of the highest tariff rates and most restrictive non-tariff barriers in the region. Yet in 1990 and early 1991, a series of external, political, and macroeconomic shocks-including an oil price hike spurred by the Gulf War, a reduction in remittances from Indians employed in the Middle East, a shake-up in investor confidence following the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, and growing fiscal and trade deficits-precipitated a financial crisis. relates primarily to laws that affect the ability of firms to hire and fire workers in response to changing business conditions. As explained in Ahsan and Pagés (2009) , all amendments in each year that strengthen workers' job security (and limit the ability of firms to adjust employment) are coded as +1. Such amendments include reductions in firms' ability to retrench, increases in the cost of making layoffs, and restrictions on firm closures. All amendments in each year that weaken workers' job security and strengthen the capacity of firms to adjust employment are coded as -1. Next, a state is assigned a 0 for each year in which there were no legislative changes affecting employment adjustment (neutral legislation). As the final step in the construction of the Adjustment variable and similar to the strategy in Ahsan and Pagés (2009) , we added these values of +1, 0, and -1 over time to create a cumulative indicator of net amendments, up to each year of data in the analysis. This summation was implemented in order to construct a measure that would evaluate a state's overall exposure to particular regulations passed in preceding years.
In this set-up, labor law amendments passed in a year affect outcomes in subsequent years. Note that after the summation, a value of zero does not necessarily mean the absence of legislative activity. For some states, the summation resulted in the positive and negative values cancelling out with a net effect of zero for the cumulative regulations over time.
The distribution across states of these amendments over time in affecting employers' ability to retrench is shown in Figure 1 . One can readily see that the majority of states had no net changes over time to regulations affecting the ability of firms to hire and fire workers. Of the seven states that did have such changes, all made regulatory changes that favored workers rather than employers. Maharashtra and West Bengal in particular stand out for changing the regulatory environment in a pro-worker direction.
Insert Figure 1 Here
A similar procedure was followed to construct the second category of regulatory changes labeled -Disputes.‖ In particular, in each year, any state amendment that made it easier for workers to initiate and sustain an industrial dispute or that lengthened the resolution of industrial disputes was coded as +1. Conversely, any state amendment that limited the capacity of workers to initiate and sustain an industrial dispute or that facilitated the resolution of industrial disputes was coded as -1. In years when there were no changes in laws related to procedures for resolving industrial disputes, states were assigned a 0. Again, as the final step in the construction of the Disputes variable, these values of +1, 0, and -1 were added over time to create a cumulative indicator of net changes to the laws on disputes up to each year of the analysis.
The distribution of these net changes over time across states in laws on procedures for the resolution of industrial disputes is shown in Figure 2 . In contrast to trends in the Adjustment variable, regulatory changes over time to procedures for the resolution of disputes tended to favor employers and not workers, especially in Andhra Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Tamil Nadu.
Note that West Bengal which was prominent for having pro-worker regulatory changes affecting firms' employment adjustment capacity also stands out for having pro-worker changes on procedures for resolving industrial disputes.
Insert Figure 2 Here
The third category of regulatory actions, -Chapter 5b‖, captures the cumulative direction of amendments to Chapter 5b of the IDA. In sum, Chapter 5b prohibits firms that employ a certain threshold number of workers to cease operations without permission from the state. In 1947, Chapter 5b applied to all firms with more than 300 workers. As of 1982, this threshold was reduced to firms with more than 100 workers. While this provision is one of many laws affecting firms' capacity to adjust the number of their employees (coded above as -Adjustment‖), this particular provision has stood out over time as the most contentious. Any amendment that set a lower threshold for firms would be coded as +1, since the lower threshold would be pro-worker in the sense of widening the coverage to more firms who would be constrained in their ability to lay-off workers at will. Similarly, raising the threshold would necessitate a coding of -1, reflecting a change in a pro-employer direction. Finally, each state is assigned a 0 for each year in which there were no legislative changes affecting the firm size threshold in state legislation relating to Chapter 5b. Again, as the final step in the construction of the -Chapter 5b‖ variable, we added these values of +1, 0, and -1 over time to create a cumulative indicator of the net directions of amendments, up to each year of the analysis. The results are depicted in Figure 3 .
Insert Figure 3 Here
One can readily see that five states had amendments in the pro-worker direction to
Chapter 5b of the IDA. Each of these states set a lower firm size threshold for the application of
Chapter 5b, thus preventing a larger population of firms from retrenching workers at will. For example, in 1981, the state of Maharashtra passed an amendment to Chapter 5b that extended the prohibition to lay-off workers without government permission from firms with 300 employees to firms with 100 employees.
Figures 1 -3 provide a graphical description of the regulatory climate in India. Placing
India's labor regulations into a broader context, fairly recent information on India's overall business environment indicates that states with the best perceived business environment include Maharashtra, Gujarat, New Delhi, Tamil Nadu, and Karnataka ( Mitra et al. (2002) , which found these states to be the most industrialized and also the best equipped in terms of infrastructure. In contrast to the states with favorable business climates, the states with the worse business environments in Table 1 are Bihar, Orissa, West Bengal, Kerala, Jharkhand, and Uttar Pradesh, with Bihar having by far the largest proportion of negative responses. Note that in a set of consistency checks with additional questions in the survey, for states with the top five business environments, respondents overwhelmingly responded that these states had both a better general business environment and a better environment for their particular industry compared to the state in which they were located. In contrast, business owners overwhelmingly preferred their own state compared to the states with the worse business environments. 
Insert

III. METHODOLOGY AND DATA
To measure the implications of labor regulation on indicators of job quality, the analysis uses an empirical specification adapted from Ahsan and Pagés (2009) and Gruber (1994) that relates a set of job quality outcomes to worker characteristics and labor regulations across states over time. This specification assesses how job quality changed over time and across states with different regulatory environments while controlling for worker characteristics and state macroeconomic indicators. Similar to the methodology in Gruber (1994) , we employ a differences-in-differences-in-differences (DDD) approach in order to identify the effects of labor law amendments. The impact of labor laws on job quality indicators is identified by controlling for differences over implementation of regulations, over states, and over time (years). This approach controls for state and time heterogeneity that might otherwise contaminate results.
We express the determinants of job quality for individual workers as follows:
--- (1) where i denotes an employee, j denotes a state, and t denotes time. The notation is a set of variables representing the regulatory environment in the labor market across states and over time. The notation is a state-specific effect that is common to all individuals in each state, and is a time-specific effect that is common to all individuals in each year. The three-way interaction (β 9 ) is the DDD term, which isolates the effect of labor law amendments on job quality net of changes across states and over time. Finally, is a workerspecific idiosyncratic error term.
Regressions are performed with repeated cross-section data at the worker level for the first four measures of job quality: wage levels, working full-time, paid in cash only, and having a secure job. All regressions at the worker level are estimated separately for men and women. For the fifth measure -residual gender wage gaps -regressions are performed at the aggregate level with state averages over time. Although the residual gender wage gaps are constructed from worker level data, these are averaged to the state and year level in order to assess the impact of labor regulations on discrimination where labor regulations and measures of public finance vary only at the state and time level (not at the worker level). All models are estimated with Ordinary Least Squares. 4 All regressions are weighted using sample weights provided in the NSSO data for the relevant years; the weights correct for the fact that the proportion of individuals and households in the sample for each year differs from the proportion in the true population. In addition, we report robust standard errors clustered at the state level.
To estimate the regressions, the study draws on five cross-sections of household survey data collected by the National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) in India. percent, and the percentage of workers with at least secondary school had risen to 30 percent.
Insert Table 2 Here Among other indicators, the majority of the sample lived in urban areas, which is consistent with the fact that the sample covers just manufacturing sector workers. Finally, the bulk of the sample was married, had no technical education, lived in households headed by men, and claimed Hinduism as their religion. Interestingly, on average across the years, about one quarter of the workers belonged to the lowest tier of India's class system: the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes.
Merged into the panel data on worker characteristics is a separate database of public finance variables at the state level that serve as control variables. The variables cover 16 states for each of the five years for which we have NSSO data (1983, 1987, 1993, 1999, and 2004) Note that as a consequence of employing a DDD procedure, we are confident that the direction of causality underlying the results is from labor regulations to the job quality measures.
Providing further support for the argument that reverse causality is not a concern, state governments have passed no amendments to the IDA since 1989. Given that most of the data in this study were collected after that year, the direction of causality is most plausibly from regulations to the job quality measures rather than the other way around. 8 Closely related, we are confident that the selection of workers into and out of states with pro-labor or pro-employer legislative activity is not an issue in this research since migration rates across states within India are extremely low (Munshi and Rosenzweig 2009 ). employment adjustment that are in a pro-worker direction have a positive impact on men's job quality as measured by wages and the probability of having a secure job. More specifically, a legislative amendment to any of the IDA's regulations on employment adjustment in a proworker direction contributes to a wage increase of 6 percent for men, and the probability that men have a secure job increases by 3 percent.
IV. RESULTS
Job Quality Determinants for Male and Female Workers
Insert Table 3 Here
In contrast, regulations associated with employment adjustment that are in a pro-worker direction have a negative impact on the probability of men working full-time and working for cash only. Since cash is fungible, we consider compensation in cash to be the preferred outcome.
Results show that the likelihood that men work full-time falls by 3 percent and the likelihood that men work for cash-only falls by 5 percent for a unit increase in the Adjustment variable. Hence men benefit in terms of wages and job security from regulations restricting employers from adjusting the size of their workforces at will, but employers may circumvent these costs by passing on to workers the additional expense of these regulations by reducing hours and by substituting in-kind payments for cash payments.
Labor law amendments that prolong the time it takes to settle disputes also yield both benefits and costs for men. Extending the time it takes to settle labor disputes raises men's wages by 9 percent and leads to 3 percent increase in the likelihood of working full-time but has negative effects on the probability of having a secure job. For a unit increase in the Disputes variable, the probability of having a secure job declines by 4 percent. Hence men experience less job security for the gains they get in wages and hours from regulations that lengthen the duration of resolving disputes.
In terms of the other determinants of men's job quality, higher levels of schooling are associated with higher pay and greater job security. Strikingly, men with graduate school are 4 percent less likely to work full-time. Manufacturing sector work is likely to be blue-collar in nature; these results suggest that individuals with advanced levels of schooling are more likely to take on white-collar service sector positions. Experience has the expected positive but non-linear effect on wages, while lack of technical education has strong negative impacts on wages and the probability of full-time work. Moreover, married men are more likely to earn higher wages and work on a full-time basis, whereas men belonging to the disadvantaged groups in India are 6 percent less likely to work full-time. Finally, job security is about 17 percent lower in rural areas. Table 4 presents results for the determinants of job quality for women workers. In contrast to the mixed results for men, the Adjustment and Disputes variables have large positive effects on mostly all four measures of women's job quality. In only one case out of eight (the impact of regulations on Disputes resolution on the probability of working full-time) is the coefficient imprecisely estimated. The positive coefficients on the Adjustment variable in these regressions indicate that a unit increase in regulations on employers' ability to adjust their workforce in a pro-worker direction is associated with substantially higher wages and increases of 10 to 29 percent in the probability of full-time work, working for cash only, and holding a secure job, respectively.
Insert Table 4 Here
These marginal effects are considerably larger in absolute value than the effects reported for men, suggesting not only that women experience a greater variety of benefits in terms of different measures of job quality but also that women's job quality is more responsive to labor law changes as compared to men. Similar conclusions apply to the effects of regulations that prolong the duration of dispute resolution, with large, positive, and statistically significant effects for women's wages levels, the probability of being compensated in cash, and the probability of having a secure job.
In terms of the other determinants of women's job quality, higher levels of schooling are associated with higher pay and somewhat greater job security. However, women workers with higher levels of schooling are less likely to work full-time although they would command substantially higher wages if they chose to do so. Table 4 indicates that women with graduate school are about 36 percent less likely to be employed full-time and likely to earn wages that are over 100 percent higher as compared to women without any schooling. Potential experience has the expected positive yet non-linear effect on women's wages; experience also reduces the probability of women having full-time work. In particular, an additional year of experience reduces the probability of full-time work by about 1 percent. Some of this result may reflect trends in caring labor as women of child-bearing age and relatively older women workers are more likely to work part-time in an effort to combine work with family responsibilities. The lack of technical education also has a negative effect on women's likelihood of working full-time and married women are 14 percent more likely to work on a full-time basis conditional on the number of pre-school children in the household. The positive association between marriage and full-time work may be explained by the fact that households in India do not tend to be unitary in nature, thus older relatives are likely to be present to provide assistance with childcare.
Moreover, women belonging to the disadvantaged social groups in India are approximately 10 percent less likely to work full-time. Finally, in keeping with the results for men in rural India, women workers are about 15 percent less likely to have secure jobs.
Focus on Chapter 5b
As a specification test for the results in Tables 3 and 4 , we replaced the Adjustment variable with the measure of cumulative amendments to Chapter 5b with the reasoning that
Chapter 5b constitutes a subset of the regulations affecting employment adjustment. These results are found in Table 5 . The positive and statistically significant impacts of regulations affecting employment adjustment on men's wages and on men's job security in the original model (Model 1) are retained in the alternative specification (Model 2). For instance, a unit increase in the Chapter 5b variable is associated with a 14 percent increase in wages and a 3 percent increase in the likelihood of having job security. However, amendments to Chapter 5b reduce the likelihood that men work full-time and work for cash only (by 6 percent and 2 percent, respectively). These conclusions are similar in substance to those from the broader Adjustment variable in Model 1. Hence, while Chapter 5b may have caused more contention than other provisions of the IDA, the results suggest that such amendments improved some measures of job quality for male workers in the manufacturing sector.
Insert Table 5 Here
As with the results for men, the coefficients on the Chapter 5b variable (Model 2) for women in Table 5 are similar in sign, statistical significance, and relative magnitude as the coefficients on the broader Adjustment variable (Model 1) in all cases except wages.
Amendments to Chapter 5b have no statistically significant impact on wages, suggesting that the large impact of Adjustment regulations on wages arises from regulations other than Chapter 5b.
In contrast, amendments to Chapter 5b do have a positive and statistically significant impact on women's probability of full-time work, probability of being compensated in cash, and job security. These results indicate that for the most part, amendments to Chapter 5b in a pro-worker direction were beneficial for women workers employed in manufacturing.
Residual Gender Wage Gaps
The final test considers the impact of labor regulations on the residual wage gap between men and women with results reported in Table 6 . The residual wage gap is estimated using the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition procedure, a technique that decomposes the wage gap in a particular year into a portion explained by average group differences in productivity characteristics and a residual portion that is commonly attributed to discrimination (Oaxaca 1973; Blinder 1973) . Results in Table 6 for the Disputes variable in Model 1 indicate that amending such regulations in a pro-worker direction widens the residual wage gap between men and women. The same conclusion applies in Model 2, suggesting that most of the effect on the unexplained portion of the wage gap comes from Disputes amendments as opposed to the Adjustment variable, which is insignificant. This conclusion is consistent with the results for Model 2 in Table 5 where the Disputes variable is seen to increase men's wages but have a negative impact on women's compensation. These findings suggest that regulations that make it easier for workers to initiate and sustain industrial disputes or that lengthen the resolution of such disputes may lead to relative wage biases against women.
Insert Table 6 Here
V. CONCLUSION
This study has examined the extent to which India's regulatory environment in the labor market affects various measures of job quality across states. Results confirm that measures of job quality are indeed sensitive to state-level statutory laws that govern industrial and labor relations in India's manufacturing sector, and these responses differ along gender lines. Labor law amendments affecting employment adjustment, dispute settlement, and Chapter 5b of the IDA have pronounced impacts on wages, probabilities of full-time work, probabilities of being compensated in cash, and job security. In particular, restrictions on employment adjustment in a pro-worker direction result in substantially higher wages for men and women, and they contribute to increases in the probability of having a secure job of 3 percent for men and 29 percent for women. Women gain further from restrictions on employment adjustment in terms of the likelihood of working full-time and working for cash only, while men experience set-backs in these two indicators. However, regulations that make it easier for workers to initiate and sustain industrial disputes can lead to a widening in the residual gender wage gap, a commonly-used measure of wage discrimination against women.
The most contentious of all labor regulations, Chapter 5b, has mixed effects on the four measures of job security for men, and mostly positive effects for women, when law-makers legislate in a pro-worker direction. For example, Chapter 5b amendments increase job security by 3 percent for men and the corresponding estimate for women is about seven times larger. In contrast, Chapter 5b amendments have a dampening effect on the likelihood that men will work full-time and work for cash only, while these effects are positive and large for women. Although previous researchers argue that this particular provision of the IDA reduced investment, employment, and output, our results highlight that workers, especially women workers, may have indeed experienced some gains in job quality from this regulation. Overall, this study's estimates indicate that employment protection legislation can bring positive effects to workers but the benefits do not apply across the board. Hence when employers face restrictions on modes of adjusting their workforce and settling labor disputes, workers experience some gains in terms of job quality but also bear some of the additional costs of the restrictions.
These findings make an interesting contribution to the literature on employment regulation because previous work, by and large, has found surprisingly few benefits from regulations that restrict labor market flexibility and make it more difficult for employers to control the size and composition of their workforce. In Freeman (2009)'s review of this literature, earlier studies have found that employment protection legislation and similar laws regulating the ability of employers to adjust their workforce and control disputes primarily result in the shift of output and employment away from the formal sector toward the informal sector.
Specific to India, Freeman concluded that it was difficult to find any gains for workers from international trade and globalization, regulations that tie the hands of employers in their ability to adjust to competitive forces could even be seen as doing more harm than good. 9 However, these earlier studies focused mostly on the quantity of jobs rather than the quality of those jobs. Yet recent scholarly and policy discourse has been paying more attention to job quality and how -good jobs‖ can contribute not only to short-term individual well-being but also to longer-term collective benefits such as poverty reduction and productivity growth (World Bank 2011). In considering job quality, our results indicate that employment protection legislation can indeed have a silver lining, especially for women workers in manufacturing. Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses, and sample means are weighted. All means are expressed in percentage terms unless otherwise noted. 
